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1. Introduction1
The economies in Europe contracted sharply and almost synchronously during the global financial crisis.2
Economic performance after the crisis, however, varied widely. Figure 1 plots real per-capita GDP for 293
countries including the United States, the European Union, Switzerland, and Norway. Taken as a whole,4
the recovery in Europe is similar to that of the United States. This similarity, however, masks a tremendous5
amount of variation across Europe. At one end of the spectrum is Greece, where per capita income at the6
end of 2014 is almost 25 percent below its 2009 level. While Greece’s GDP performance is exceptionally7
poor, a persistent contraction in GDP over this period is not unique. About a third of the countries have8
end-2014 levels of real per-capita GDP at or below their 2009 levels. At the other end of the spectrum is9
Lithuania. Like Greece, Lithuania experienced a strong contraction during the Great Recession. However,10
it then returned to a rapid rate of growth quickly thereafter.11
We find that cross-country differences in austerity, defined as government purchases below forecast,12
statistically account for roughly three quarters of the cross-sectional variation in GDP during the 2010-201413
period. At a time when faltering economies required stimulus, most countries in Europe cut government14
spending. Other austerity policies—such as cutting transfer payments or increasing taxes—do not explain15
the cross-sectional variation in output. There is little evidence that austerity is a consequence of the run-up16
of government debt during the Great Recession. Austerity policies were pursued by almost all of Europe17
regardless of their debt to GDP ratios in 2009.18
The stark negative relationship between austerity in government purchases and GDP is robust to the19
method used to forecast both GDP and government purchases in the 2010-2014 period, and holds for20
countries with fixed as well as flexible exchange rates. The cross-sectional relationship between austerity21
and GDP is statistically robust to the inclusion of other variables such as TFP, household debt, sovereign risk22
premia and taxes. Austerity in government purchases is negatively associated with consumption, investment,23
GDP growth, and inflation. In addition, austerity is associated with an increase in net exports. This effect24
is larger for countries within the euro area and those with exchange rates fixed to the euro. Regressing GDP25
on austerity yields a slope coefficient of 1.75 – slightly higher than the “open-economy relative multiplier”26
for U.S. states reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). Our estimate is in line with other studies that27
suggest that government spending multipliers are substantially higher during recessions (see e.g. Auerbach28
and Gorodnichenko, 2012) and during periods in which nominal interest rates are at the ZLB (e.g. Miyamoto29
et al., 2018).30
We develop a multi-country DSGE model that generates cross-sectional patterns in macroeconomic vari-31
ables that are consistent with the data. The model features trade in intermediate goods, sticky prices,32
hand-to-mouth consumers, and financial frictions. The model is calibrated to reflect relative country size,33
observed trade flows and financial linkages, as well as the country’s exchange rate regime. The model incor-34
porates shocks to government purchases and monetary policy. Consistent with our empirical findings, the35
model generates a positive relationship between austerity and net exports, and a strong negative relationship36
between austerity and inflation. In the model, a cut in government spending reduces aggregate demand;37
because prices do not adjust in the short run, there is downward pressure on wages and employment. Facing38
a reduction in income, hand-to-mouth consumers further reduce spending, amplifying the fall in aggregate39
demand. The reduction in aggregate demand also reduces the net worth of firms, raising leverage ratios40
and increasing the cost of capital. At the same time, a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and41
foreign goods limits the extent to which any excess supply of the home good can be exported. These effects42
combine to produce a fall in wages, deflation, a fall in consumption and output. The zero lower bound43
(ZLB) plays an important role in generating large effects of government spending within countries but has44
little influence on the magnitude of the cross-sectional impact of austerity for countries in a currency union.45
One of the advantages of the model relative to the existing literature is that it adds realistic heterogeneity46
in terms of country size, trade openness and monetary policy regime. The model shows that the impact of47
austerity is weaker when the trade elasticity is high, and when the share of imports in government spending48
is high. For countries in a currency union, domestic spending has a smaller influence on production if the49
country is more open to trade. Quantitatively, spillover effects from austerity in other countries in Europe50
are large enough to reduce domestic production and increase debt-to-GDP. The magnitude of this effect51
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varies substantially across countries.52
Overall, our model corroborates the empirical finding that austerity may have played a major role in53
explaining the cross-sectional patterns of macroeconomic variables observed in Europe during the 2010-54
2014 period. In addition, we use our model to conduct a number of counterfactual experiments. We first55
use the model to generate macroeconomic outcomes in the absence of austerity. For the EU10 (Belgium,56
Germany, Estonia, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, and Finland), the57
model generates a seven percent drop in production relative to the non-austerity counterfactual. Austerity58
resulted in even greater losses in the GIIPS economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The59
model suggests that austerity fully accounts for the large drop in output for these countries.60
Allowing European nations to pursue independent monetary policy in the face of austerity helps limit61
the drop in GDP. Relative to the benchmark model, the flexibility of independent monetary policy raises62
output for the GIIPS economies but reduces output for the EU10. This is because the nominal exchange63
rate depreciates in the GIIPS region, stimulating exports and output. In contrast, under the euro, the EU1064
already enjoys the export advantage of a relatively weak currency.65
Finally, the model allows us to consider the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio under different conditions.66
The main rationale for austerity was to reduce debt and bring debt-to-GDP ratios back to historical norms.67
However, our model suggests that reductions in government spending had such a severe contractionary effect68
on economic activity that debt-to-GDP ratios in several countries actually increased as a result. In addition,69
the model reveals that the austerity measures undertaken by countries’ trading partners also contributed70
importantly to rising domestic debt-to-GDP ratios.71
2. Related Literature72
Our research relates to a large and growing body of work on the economic consequences of fiscal austerity73
and tax and spending multipliers in open economy settings. Perhaps the most closely related paper is74
Blanchard and Leigh (2013). They regress errors from institutional sector forecasts of real GDP growth on75
forecasts of fiscal consolidation for the 2010 – 2011 period to argue that most analysts underestimated the76
size of the fiscal multiplier. They find that a $1 rise in fiscal consolidation (either through revenue or outlays)77
was associated with a $1 real GDP loss relative to forecast and conclude that actual fiscal “multipliers were78
substantially above 1”, with the exact size depending on the assumed multipliers in the GDP forecasts.179
Our approach differs in that we use a DSGE model to consider what would happen if the measured80
forecast errors were structural shocks. As Blanchard and Leigh point out, such forecast errors “are unlikely81
to be orthogonal to economic developments” and thus may not provide direct evidence on the magnitude82
of government spending multipliers. While Blanchard and Leigh are correct, examining the time series and83
covariance patterns in forecast errors does provide meaningful information regarding the type of underlying84
shocks experienced by European economies. Three points are worth emphasizing in this regard. First, unlike85
Blanchard and Leigh, we examine many indicators of economic performance, not just GDP. Austerity shocks86
should presumably be associated with negative forecast errors in inflation and positive forecast errors in net87
exports. If one did not find such associated forecast errors then this would be evidence against the view that88
government spending shocks played an important role in the European economic experience of 2010-2014.89
Second, we control for many other potential sources of economic disturbances. We directly include90
measured tax changes, debt levels, interest rate spreads, and productivity in our cross-sectional regressions.91
To the extent that these alternative disturbances were actually to blame for limiting the European recovery,92
one should expect that the additional explanatory power of government spending shocks would disappear93
once we include the other forcing variables. As shall be seen, this is not the case.94
Finally, our objective is not to argue that the headline relationship between forecast errors in government95
spending and forecast errors in GDP provides an econometric estimate of a multiplier. Rather, we show that96
1The forecasts of GDP used by Blanchard and Leigh already incorporate the expected effects of planned fiscal consolidation.
Blanchard and Leigh believe that “a reasonable case can be made that [assumed] multipliers [were] about 0.5.” In other words,
had forecasters assumed a multiplier of zero, Blanchard and Leigh would have found a $1.5 GDP loss for every $1 of fiscal
consolidation, close to our benchmark finding of a $1.77 loss.
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the measured shortfalls in government spending in 2010-2014 are sufficiently large, and are distributed across97
Europe in such a way, as to generate the changes in output, inflation and net exports as observed in the98
data. This conclusion is supported both by reduced-form empirical estimates as well as model simulations.99
Alesina et al. (2015) and Alesina et al. (2016) follow the ‘narrative’ approach pioneered by Romer and100
Romer (2010) to examine the economic consequences of planned, multi-year, fiscal adjustments in OECD101
economies. According to their analysis, spending-based fiscal consolidations entail relatively small economic102
costs while tax-based consolidations are substantially more costly. Our analysis differs from theirs in several103
ways. While Alesina et al. (2015) base their conclusions on data since 1978, our paper focuses exclusively on104
the post-crisis period of 2010-2014, which was characterized by large contractions in government spending,105
a preexisting currency union, interest rates close to the ZLB, and financial market failures. We also focus on106
actual changes in spending and taxes rather than preannounced plans for fiscal consolidation. By measuring107
the cumulated effect of austerity over five years, we capture the full effect of any policy that was actually108
implemented, including anticipated or lagged effects of the policy. Finally, our conclusions are based on109
the wide variation in austerity observed across countries during this time period, rather than time-series110
variation.111
The setup of our model is similar to Martin and Philippon (2017) who examine business cycle dynamics112
in eleven euro area countries around the time of the financial crisis. In their model, fiscal consolidations are113
a consequence of the buildup in public debt prior to the crisis and the associated increase in credit spreads.114
Our results are similar to the extent that contractions in government spending are associated with large115
reductions in economic activity in the aftermath of the Great Recession. However, we find only a weak116
connection between pre-existing government debt and austerity in 2010-2014 in the full sample of European117
economies. Furthermore, we find clear evidence of negative effects of austerity, controlling for the level of118
debt and credit spreads. The data indicate that austerity was pursued across Europe, even in countries119
with relatively low levels of public debt. It is not debt that drives austerity in the aftermath of the Great120
Recession, but rather austerity that depresses GDP and generates rising debt-to-GDP ratios.121
Several papers have studied fiscal policy in a two-country framework: Blanchard et al. (2016) study how122
changes in spending by the core economies in Europe affect countries on the periphery. Consistent with our123
findings, their model produces sizeable spillover effects when monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB.124
Our model highlight that these spillover effects (and the effects of domestic fiscal policy) substantially vary125
in size and sign across countries in our multi-country model that is calibrated to match relative country126
size, trade linkages, heterogeneous fiscal policy and actual differences in monetary policy regimes. Kollmann127
et al. (2016) estimate a three-region model to tease out the factors that explain the different recovery paths128
observed in the United States and the euro area as a whole. As is clear from Figure 1, and in line with129
the findings in Kollmann et al. (2016), differences between the two aggregate regions are relatively small130
particularly compared to the much larger differences between European countries. Hence, it is perhaps not131
surprising that fiscal policy is found to play a limited role in their analysis. In contrast, Engler and Tervala132
(2018) show in a framework that allows for hysteresis effects of fiscal policy that austerity can account for133
about 80 percent of the overall euro area’s output deviation from trend in 2013. Our study is complementary134
to these studies in that we focus on the cross-sectional heterogeneity in economic performance across Europe.135
3. The Empirical Relationship between Austerity and Economic Performance136
The data set includes the 28 largest economies in Europe and the United States (see the data appendix for137
details regarding primary sources and definition of variables). Twenty countries in the sample are formally138
in the euro area or are pegged to the euro (EU10, GIIPS, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Latvia and Lithuania)139
and the remaining nine have floating exchange rates. Country size varies from less than one percent of the140
European aggregate (e.g. Cyprus and Luxembourg) to almost 100 percent (the United States is roughly141
the same size as the European aggregate). The import share varies from a low of 13 percent in the United142
States to very high shares in Ireland and Luxembourg (44 percent and 57 percent, respectively). The average143
import share in our sample of European countries is 32 percent. The model in Section 4 will capture the144
extent of bilateral trade linkages between country pairs, as well as the overall openness to trade.145
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3.1. Measuring Austerity146
We measure austerity as a shortfall in government purchases relative to forecast. Our empirical approach147
borrows from Blanchard and Leigh (2013), as discussed in the previous section. However, rather than relying148
on forecasts generated by the IMF or national governments, we produce our own forecast measures. This149
has several advantages: First, institutional forecasts are typically not available for a horizon of five years.150
Second, we will understand the key driving factors in producing the forecasts themselves. Third, we see how151
the results change with different forecast specification.2 And fourth, we can consider additional variables152
for which institutional forecasts are not available.153
To illustrate our approach, the left column of Figure 2 shows real government purchases since 1996 for four154
countries: Germany, France, Greece and the United States. The years 2010-2014—our period of interest—is155
shaded. It is clear from the plots that government purchases declined significantly in Greece and, to a lesser156
extent, the United States. The decline was more modest in France and there is no discernable decline in157
Germany. This characterization of the data does not depend on a particular forecast method—a simple158
linear trend would yield essentially the same conclusion regarding the extent of austerity in government159
purchases.160
We adopt the following forecast specification:161
lnGi,t = lnGi,t−1 + gˆEU + γˆ
(
ln ŶEU,t−1 − lnYi,t−1
)
+ εGi,t. (1)
Here lnGi,t is the log of real government purchases per capita in country i (deflated by the GDP deflator)162
at time t, lnYi,t is the log of real GDP per capita for country i at time t, and gi,t is the corresponding163
growth rate, calculated as the difference in log GDP. The “hat” indicates a predicted value of the variable.164
This forecast specification accounts for both average growth in GDP (the parameter gEU ) and convergence165
dynamics (through the parameter γ). The forecast assumes that all countries are converging to a common166
growth rate gEU and that growth rates in Central and Eastern European countries are expected to decline167
as their per-capita GDP approaches Western European levels. For countries other than Central and Eastern168
Europe, the inclusion of the convergence effect has a very small impact on the forecast.169
The forecasting equation (1) requires estimates of the average growth rate of GDP in Europe, gEU ,170
the convergence parameter γ and predicted values for average log real per capita output in Europe YˆEU,t.171
These estimates are based on annual data for twelve advanced euro area economies over 1993-2005 using172
the specification173
lnYEU,t = βEU + gEU · t+ εEU,t. (2)
The estimated value for gEU is 0.018 (i.e., 1.8 percent annual growth) with a standard error of 0.0016.174
ln ŶEU,t are the fitted values from (2).175
The convergence parameter γ is estimated from the regression176
gi,t − gˆEU = γ
(
ln YˆEU,t−1 − lnYi,t−1
)
+ εγi,t (3)
using a sample that includes all countries in Central and Eastern Europe for the same time period. The177
estimated value for γ is 0.024 with a standard error of 0.002.178
The forecast errors for 2010 through 2014 are the difference between predicted values based on (1) and179
the actual values. The predicted values are based on the forecasting parameters as well as information on180
government purchases up to 2009. For the year 2010, we therefore use the actual realizations of lnGi,2009181
and lnYi,2009 in (1). Starting from t = 2011, we replace lnGi,t−1 and lnYi,t−1 with their predicted values (we182
describe the forecasts for Yi,t−1 below). Thus, for 2010-2014, our forecasts use actual data on government183
purchases and GDP up to 2009. The predicted paths for government purchases and GDP are dotted lines184
2Our results are essentially invariant to the forecast specification. The paper presents the results only for a single forecast
specification that in our view is representative of the set of forecast specifications considered. Interested readers can contact
the authors for details on the other specifications.
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in Figure 2. The cumulated forecast errors are consistent with the view that the fiscal stance was austere185
in Greece, somewhat austere in the United States and France, and neutral in Germany.186
Forecasts for other fiscal policy measures are constructed as follows: Forecasts for social benefits and187
total revenue are based on a modified version of equation (1) that includes contemporaneous GDP to control188
for the mechanical link with income. These feedback parameters are estimated using data up to 2005. For189
statutory tax rates (the VAT, the top income tax rate, the top corporate tax rate) and for the ratio of primary190
balances to GDP, we adopt a random-walk specification. To reduce the sensitivity to the last observation,191
the forecast for each country takes the average value for 2008 and 2009 as the “last observation.” That is,192
for dates t after 2009 the forecast for these variables is193
xˆi,t =
1
2
2009∑
s=2008
xi,s, (4)
where xi,t is either a statutory tax rate or the ratio of primary balances relative to GDP.194
3.2. Measures of Economic Performance195
Forecasts of economic performance follow the procedure for government purchases. The right column196
of Figure 2 shows the time paths of GDP for Germany, France, Greece and the United States. GDP197
declines sharply in 2007-2009 in all four countries (and indeed in almost all countries in our sample—see the198
Appendix). Our focus is on the role of austerity in the aftermath of the Great Recession. As is clear from199
the figure, Germany and the United States experienced a drop in GDP in the recession and then reverted200
back to their pre-recession trend (albeit at a lower level). On the other hand, GDP growth in France and201
Greece remained well below trend.202
We adopt the following forecast specification for real GDP based on (3), which again allows for a conver-203
gence factor to capture the medium-run growth dynamics of the Central and Eastern European economies:204
lnYi,t = lnYi,t−1 + gˆEU + γˆ
(
ln ŶEU ,t−1 − lnYi,t−1
)
+ εYi,t. (5)
As with the forecasts for government purchases, this specification accounts for both average GDP growth205
(the parameter gEU ) and convergence dynamics (the parameter γ). The parameters gEU and γ are estimated206
over the time period 1993-2005 just as they were in Section 3.1 and ln ŶEU,t−1 is the fitted value from (2). As207
before, up to t = 2010:1, we use actual GDP data for lnYi,t−1 in (5), and replace it by its forecast ln Ŷi,t−1208
thereafter. We use the same procedure to forecast real consumption and investment. To construct forecasts209
for GDP growth, we use the estimated growth rate gˆi,t ≡ gˆEU + γˆ
(
ln ŶEU ,t−1 − lnYi,t−1
)
.210
Forecasts for the remaining performance indicators (inflation, net exports and the nominal effective211
exchange rate) are based on the random-walk specification as in (4). Plots for all series, actual and forecasts,212
are provided in Figures A2a to A8e in the Appendix.213
3.3. Austerity and Economic Performance in the Cross Section214
Figure 3 is a scatter plot of austerity and the decline in GDP in our cross section of countries. Austerity215
(along the x-axis) is the shortfall in government purchases relative to forecast, expressed as a share of GDP216
and averaged over 2010-2014. The y-axis is the shortfall in GDP relative to forecast, again averaged over217
2010-2014. Dark circles indicate countries within the euro area or with a fixed exchange rate to the euro,218
while the open circles are countries with floating exchange rates. There is a strong negative relationship219
between the two variables: the more severe the austerity, the greater the decline in output. A regression line220
fitted through the points in Figure 3 delivers a slope coefficient of -2.22 with a standard error of 0.25. This221
suggests that a shortfall in government purchases of one percent of GDP is associated with a decline in real222
GDP of 2.22 percent relative to forecast. The relationship between austerity and output is invariant to the223
exchange rate regime. Greece stands out as having both the sharpest decline in government purchases and224
the steepest fall in GDP. However, the relationship between austerity and economic activity is not driven by225
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Greece. The estimated coefficient is -1.96 (standard error 0.33) when we exclude Greece and -2.05 (standard226
error 0.36) when we exclude all GIIPS economies.227
The data indicate that it is austerity in the form of reductions in government purchases, and not increases228
in taxes or cuts to social benefits, that are most highly correlated with the decline in output. To establish229
this, we regress a number of alternative policy variables (each as a deviation from forecast and, if necessary,230
scaled by GDP) on the 2010-2014 decline in GDP:231
Y˜i,2010−2014 = α0 + αG˜i,2010−2014 + εi (6)
Here Y˜i,2010−2014 denotes the average forecast error for GDP, 120
∑2014:4
t=2010:1
(
lnYi,t − ln Yˆi,t
)
. Similarly,232
G˜i,2010−2014 is the average forecast error for government purchases (or any of the other policy variables)233
expressed as a percent of GDP. By expressing policy variables as a share of output, the coefficient α can234
be compared to estimates of the multiplier in the literature.3 Note that the estimates are based on cross-235
sectional variation in the data rather than time-series variation.236
The first column in Table 1a reflects the slope coefficient in Figure 3 of -2.22. Reductions in social benefits237
and increases in the VAT have a comparable coefficient to government purchases, but the coefficients are238
estimated with large standard errors and explain little of the cross-country variation in GDP. We conclude239
that austerity, in the form of a shortfall in government purchases is the most significant fiscal policy for240
explaining output in the 2010-2014 period.4 Based on these results, in what follows we use “austerity” to241
refer exclusively to reductions in government purchases.242
One concern about these estimates is the possibility that the drop in government spending was a result243
of a contraction in economic activity caused by some third variable. Technically, our empirical analysis244
captures correlations in the data that may or may not reflect a causal relationship. To partially address245
these endogeneity concerns, Table 1b provides evidence on the significance of austerity after controlling for246
other variables in regression (6). The table reports estimates of the effect of austerity on real GDP for eleven247
different econometric specifications when controlling for changes in total revenue, total factor productivity248
(TFP), and four measures of credit market conditions: the household debt-to-GDP ratio, the government249
debt-to-GDP ratio, the private credit spread and the government bond spread. Controlling for total revenue250
decreases the coefficient on austerity slightly. Controlling for TFP also weakens the coefficient to -1.79.251
Including credit measures (columns (4) through (7)) has very little impact on the estimates, including the252
specification controling for government debt. Columns (8) through (11) include total revenue and TFP253
together with each of the credit measures. Depending on the controls, the estimated coefficient on austerity254
is between −2.22 (specification 1) and −1.64 (specification 8). The coefficients change only slightly when255
the GIIPS countries are dropped from the sample (see Appendix Table A4b). We take specification (11)256
and the coefficient of −1.77 as our benchmark for assessing the performance of the model in Section 4. This257
specification has the virtue of producing an estimate roughly in the middle of the range of estimates and258
includes controls for productivity, taxes and credit market stress.259
An additional concern is that austerity policies during this period were motivated by the need to reduce260
debt, and therefore it is debt, not austerity, that depresses output. To evaluate this hypothesis, we regress the261
debt-to-GDP ratio in 2009 on our 2010-2014 average forecast errors for a number of fiscal policy measures,262
such as government purchases and tax rates. The coefficients reported in Table 2 are small and generally263
insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that in the cross-section, austerity policies are not correlated264
with the 2009 debt-to-GDP ratio. Put another way, austerity policies were pursued by most countries in265
Europe, including those that had not accumulated high levels of public debt. Again, while the results in266
Tables 1a, 1b and 2 suggest that it is spending austerity – not tax changes, productivity shocks, credit267
spreads or debt levels – that explains the observed changes in output, the number of statistical controls268
is necessarily limited. Thus, it is technically possible that some other omitted variable explains both the269
change in government spending and the change in output.270
3Tax rates are expressed in percentage points.
4In the Appendix, we show that this conclusion is robust to different forecast specifications, allowing, for instance, for a
linear time-trend specification or an AR(1) structure of economic and fiscal variables (see Table A3).
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Table 3 reports the impact of austerity on other macroeconomic variables. While these empirical results271
are interesting in and of themselves, they also provide additional information that we later use to evaluate272
the performance of our model. In each regression, we include all of the control variables from specification273
(11) of Table 1b, though the table reports only the coefficients on government purchases. The table also274
shows the results for subsamples of fixed and floating exchange rates. In particular, we interact the average275
forecast deviation of government purchases with a dummy for fixed exchange rate countries and report276
estimates of the corresponding coefficients αfix and αfl.277
The results in the table indicate that austerity is associated with declines in consumption, investment and278
GDP growth. These estimates are roughly the same across countries with fixed and floating exchange rates.279
This is somewhat surprising because models—including our own—typically predict that fiscal policy is more280
effective in currency unions (see e.g. Farhi and Werning, 2016). The decrease in investment is noteworthy281
because many textbook models would predict a crowding-out effect where decreases in government purchases282
would lead to an increase in investment. Austerity is also associated with lower inflation. Interestingly, this283
effect is independent of the exchange rate regime although the effect is stronger for fixed exchange rate284
countries. One possible interpretation of this finding is as evidence for a cross-sectional Phillips-Curve285
relationship similar to the findings in Beraja et al. (2016), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). There286
is also a strong positive association between net exports and austerity, which, for floating exchange rate287
countries, is associated with a depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate. The last six columns of288
Table 3 will be discussed in Section 5.289
In summary, we find a robust statistical relationship between austerity, measured as cuts in government290
spending relative to forecast, and a decline in GDP. The cross-sectional pattern in GDP cannot be explained291
by TFP, changes in taxes, interest rates or household debt. Austerity is also negatively correlated with292
declines in consumption and investment and with an increase in net exports.293
4. Model294
Next we develop a multi-country business cycle model that can explain the observed correlations between295
austerity and various macroeconomic variables found in Section 3 for fixed and floating exchange rate296
countries. The model is calibrated to match the economic size and bilateral trade flows of the 29 countries297
in our sample and incorporates many features from modern monetary business cycle models (e.g. Smets and298
Wouters, 2007; Christiano et al., 2005), international business cycles models (e.g. Chari et al., 2000), and299
financial accelerator models (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999; Brave et al., 2012). The main ingredients of the300
model are (i) price rigidity, (ii) international trade, (iii) hand-to-mouth consumers, (iv) a net worth channel301
for business investment, and (v) government purchases and monetary policy shocks.302
4.1. Households303
The world economy is populated by n = 1...N countries. Every country has a representative house-304
hold, firms that produce the country-specific intermediate good, and firms that produce the final good.305
As in Heathcote and Perri (2002), intermediate goods are tradable across countries, but final goods are306
nontradable. In each country, the representative household owns all of the domestic firms.307
All variables in the model are written in per-capita terms. To convert any variable to a national total,308
we scale by the population of country n, Nn. In each period t the economy experiences one event st from309
a potentially infinite set of states. We denote by st the history of events up to and including date t. The310
probability at date 0 of any particular history st is given by pi (st). Unless confusion arises, we write Xn,t311
for Xn(s
t).312
At date 0, the expected discounted sum of future period utilities for a household in country n is given313
by314
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
pi
(
st
)
βtU (cn,t, Ln,t) , (7)
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where cn,t and Ln,t denote (state-contingent) consumption and labor allocations, respectively. We set the315
flow utility function U (·) to316
U (cn, Ln) =
1
1− 1σ
cn − κnL1+ 1ηn
1 + 1η
1− 1σ , (8)
where β < 1 is the subjective time discount factor, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for317
consumption, η is the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and κn is a country-specific weight on the disutility of318
labor. This specification follows Greenwood et al. (1988) (GHH hereafter) and assumes that consumption319
and labor are complements for the household. As shown by Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) among others,320
GHH preferences play an important role for the transmission of austerity shocks by eliminating the reaction321
of labor supply to changes in household income and creating complementarities between consumption and322
labor.323
A key feature of the model is a hand-to-mouth restriction on a fraction χ of a household’s members in the324
economy. These household members receive income in proportion to their consumption share of total income325
and spend the entire amount on current consumption. That is, hand-to-mouth consumption each period is326
given by chtmn,t ≡ C¯nY¯n Yn,t where the bars indicate steady-state values.5 The remaining 1− χ members of the327
representative household choose consumption optimally and thus behave in accordance with the permanent328
income hypothesis. Aggregate consumption is then given by329
Cn,t = (1− χ) cn,t + χchtmn,t . (9)
This specification allows us to introduce hand-to-mouth behavior while leaving the other first-order condi-330
tions unchanged.331
Households in each country own the capital stock in their country. They supply labor to the intermediate332
goods producing firms and capital to the entrepreneurs. Households choose consumption cn,t, labor Ln,t,333
next period’s capital stock Kn,t and current investment Xn,t to maximize the expected discounted sum of334
future period utilities subject to a sequence of budget constraints.335
The budget constraint for country n’s representative household is336
Pn,t [(1 + τ
c
n)cn,t +Xn,t] + (1− δ)µn,tKn,t−1 +
N∑
j=1
Ej,tS
j
n,t
En,t
+
∑
st+1
%
(
st, st+1
)
bn(st, st+1)
En,t
= µn,tKn,t + (1− τLn)Wn,tLn,t + (1− τΠn )Πfn,t +
N∑
j=1
Ej,t (1 + ij,t−1)Sjn,t−1
En,t
+
bn(st−1, st)
En,t
+ Tn,t.
(10)
The left side of the budget constraint reflects household expenditures on the final consumption good,337
inclusive of a constant value-added consumption tax τ cn, and on investment. The household also participates338
in international financial markets and has access to both state-contingent and non-contingent bonds. Let339
bn(s
t, st+1) be the quantity of state-contingent bonds purchased by the household in country n after history340
st. These bonds pay off in units of a reserve currency which we take to be U.S. dollars. Let % (st, st+1) be341
the nominal price of one unit of the state-contingent bond which pays off in state st+1. Each country has342
non-contingent nominal bonds that can be traded. Let Sjn,t be the number of bonds denominated in country343
j’s currency and held by the representative agent in country n. The gross nominal interest rate for country344
n’s bonds is 1 + in,t. The nominal exchange rate to convert country n’s currency into the reserve currency345
is En,t.346
The right side of the budget constraint reflects the household’s income. The household earns nominal347
wages net of labor taxes (1− τLn)Wn,tLn,t, nominal payments for sales of capital µn,tKn,t−1 and profits from348
intermediate good firms net of taxes on profits, (1−τΠn )Πfn,t. Here Wn,t is the nominal wage, τLn is a constant349
5Technically, our specification for the hand-to-mouth consumers assumes that they spend a fixed share of domestic absorption
Yn,t rather than a fixed share of nominal national income pn,tQn,t. Quantitatively there is only a small difference between
these specifications.
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labor tax rate, µn,t is the nominal price of capital, Π
f
n,t are nominal profits of intermediate goods firms and350
τΠn is the constant tax rate on profits. We assume that households sell capital to entrepreneurs and then351
subsequently repurchase the undepreciated capital. This assumption is convenient for introducing financial352
market imperfections later. The household also receives lump-sum transfers Tn,t. This transfer includes353
nominal lump-sum taxes or transfers Tn,t, profits from the financial sector and entrepreneurs, Π
fin
n,t + Π
e
n,t,354
and the nominal amount consumed by hand-to-mouth consumers, Pn,tc
htm
n,t where Pn,t is the nominal price355
of the final good.6 Thus,356
Tn,t ≡ −Tn,t + Πen,t + Πfinn,t − Pn,tchtmn,t . (11)
The household also faces the capital accumulation constraint:357
Kn,t = Kn,t−1 (1− δ) +
[
1− f
(
Xn,t
Xn,t−1
)]
Xn,t, (12)
with f(1) = f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(1) ≥ 0, as in Christiano et al. (2005).358
The first-order conditions for an optimum are as follows. The optimizing household’s Euler equation for359
purchases of state contingent bonds bn(s
t, st+1) requires360
%
(
st, st+1
) U1,n,t
En,tPn,t
= βpi(st+1|st) U1,n,t+1
En,t+1Pn,t+1
(13)
and361
U1,n,t
En,tPn,t
=
U1,m,t
Em,tPm,t
, (14)
where Uj,n,t denotes the derivative of U (cn,t, Ln,t) with respect to its j
th argument.362
The labor supply condition is363
− U2,n,t
U1,n,t
=
(
1− τLn
1 + τ cn
)
Wn,t
Pn,t
. (15)
Finally, the optimal choice for investment and capital requires364
1 =
µn,t
Pn,t
{
1− fn,t − Xn,t
Xn,t−1
f ′n,t
}
+ β
U1,n,t+1
U1,n,t
µn,t+1
Pn,t+1
(
Xn,t+1
Xn,t
)2
f ′n,t+1, (16)
where we write fn,t = f
(
Xn,t
Xn,t−1
)
.365
4.2. Firms366
There are three types of firms in the model. The first type, referred to as “final goods producers”, are firms367
that combine tradable intermediate inputs to produce a final nontraded good for private consumption and368
investment and for government purchases. The two other types of firms produce tradable intermediate goods369
in a two-stage process. In the first stage, monopolistically competitive domestic firms use capital and labor370
to produce input varieties. Prices of the input varieties are set according to a Calvo pricing mechanism. In371
the second stage, competitive firms combine the input varieties into the tradable intermediate good. Neither372
capital nor labor can be moved across countries. Below, we describe the production chain of these three373
types of firms in detail, beginning with the production of the tradable intermediate goods.374
4.2.1. Tradable Intermediate Goods375
Each country produces a single (country-specific) type of tradable intermediate good in two stages.376
6In addition to lending to other countries, households extend domestic loans to financial intermediaries, who in turn lend to
domestic entrepreneurs at a risky interest rate (1 + in,t)F (λn,t). Profits or losses on these loans are returned to the household
as a lump sum transfer. We discuss the loans to the entrepreneurs in greater detail below.
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Second-Stage Intermediate Producers. The second-stage producers assemble the tradable intermediate good377
from domestically-produced input varieties. The second-stage producers solve378
max
qn,t(ξ)
{
pn,tQn,t −
∫ 1
0
ϕn,t (ξ) qn,t (ξ) dξ
}
(17)
subject to the CES production function379
Qn,t =
[∫ 1
0
qn,t (ξ)
ψq−1
ψq dξ
] ψq
ψq−1
. (18)
Here Qn,t is the real quantity of country n’s tradable intermediate good produced at time t. The variable380
ξ indexes the continuum of differentiated varieties and the parameter ψq > 1 governs the degree of substi-381
tutability across varieties. The nominal price of each variety is ϕn,t (ξ) and its quantity is qn,t (ξ). Demand382
for each variety has an iso-elastic form383
qn,t (ξ) = Qn,t
(
ϕn,t (ξ)
pn,t
)−ψq
. (19)
The competitive price of the intermediate pn,t is a combination of the prices of the varieties,384
pn,t =
[∫ 1
0
ϕ
1−ψq
n,t dξ
] 1
1−ψq
. (20)
First-Stage Intermediate Producers. The varieties qn,t (ξ) are produced by first-stage intermediate producers385
that hire workers at the nominal wage Wn,t and rent capital at the nominal rental price Rn,t. These firms386
have Cobb-Douglas production functions387
qn,t (ξ) = Zn [kn,t (ξ)]
α
[ln,t (ξ)]
1−α
, (21)
where Zn measures (constant) total factor productivity. Because first-stage producers are monopolistically388
competitive, they typically charge a markup for their products. The desired price naturally depends on389
the demand curve (19). Each variety good producer ξ freely chooses capital and labor each period. Cost390
minimization implies that the nominal marginal cost is391
MCn,t =
W 1−αn,t R
α
n,t
Zn
(
1
1− α
)1−α(
1
α
)α
. (22)
Pricing. The nominal prices of input varieties are adjusted only infrequently according to the standard392
Calvo mechanism. For any firm, there is a probability θ that the firm cannot change its price that period.393
When a firm can reset its price it chooses an optimal reset price. Formally, the maximization problem of a394
firm that can reset its price at date t is395
max
ϕ∗n,t
∞∑
j=0
(θβ)j
∑
st+j
pi(st+j |st) U1,t+j
(1 + τcn)Pn,t+j
(
ϕ∗n,t −MCn,t+j
)
Qn,t+j
(
ϕ∗n,t
pn,t+j
)−ψq
. (23)
We denote the optimal reset price as ϕ∗n,t. Because the first-stage intermediate producers adjust their prices396
infrequently, the nominal price of the tradable intermediate goods is sticky. In particular, using (20), the397
nominal price of the tradable intermediate good evolves according to398
pn,t =
[
θp
1−ψq
n,t−1 + (1− θ)
(
ϕ∗n,t
)1−ψq] 11−ψq . (24)
Our specification of price setting assumes that firms set prices in their own currency. As a result, when399
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exchange rates move, the implied import price moves automatically (there is complete pass-through).400
4.2.2. Final Goods Producers401
Final goods are assembled from a (country-specific) constant-returns-to-scale CES combination of trad-402
able intermediates produced by the various countries in the model. The final good producers are competitive403
in both the global input markets and the final goods market and therefore make zero profits. The final goods404
producers solve405
max
yjn,t
Pn,tYn,t −
N∑
j=1
Ej,t
En,t
pj,ty
j
n,t
 (25)
subject to the CES production function406
Yn,t =
 N∑
j=1
(
ωjn
) 1
ψy
(
yjn,t
)ψy−1
ψy

ψy
ψy−1
. (26)
Here, yjn,t is the amount of country-j intermediate good used in production by country n. The parameter407
ψy governs the degree of substitutability across the tradable intermediate goods and the preference weights408
satisfy ωjn ≥ 0 with
∑N
j=1 ω
j
n = 1 for each country n. The country-pair-specific ω
j
n parameters are later409
calibrated to match data on bilateral import shares.410
Demand for country-specific intermediate goods is isoelastic:411
yjn,t = Yn,tω
j
n
[
Ej,t
En,t
pj,t
Pn,t
]−ψy
. (27)
The implied nominal price of the final good is412
Pn,t =
 N∑
j=1
ωjn
(
Ej,t
En,t
pj,t
)1−ψy 11−ψy . (28)
Unlike the intermediate goods, the final good cannot be traded and must be used for either investment,413
consumption or government purchases in the period in which it is produced.414
4.3. Financial Market Imperfections and the Supply of Capital415
The model incorporates a financial accelerator mechanism similar to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and416
Bernanke et al. (1999). Entrepreneurs buy capital goods from households using a mix of internal and417
external funds (borrowing). The entrepreneurs rent purchased capital to the first-stage intermediate good418
producers in their own country and then sell it back to the household the following period. The interest rate419
that entrepreneurs face for borrowed funds is a function of their financial leverage ratio. As a consequence,420
fluctuations in net worth cause changes in the effective rate of return on capital and thus directly affect real421
economic activity (see also Brave et al., 2012, for the same approach).422
Formally, at the end of period t, entrepreneurs purchase capital Kn,t from the households at the nominal423
price µn,t per unit. Entrepreneurs finance these purchases with their own internal funds (net worth) and424
intermediated borrowing. Let end-of-period nominal net worth be Pn,tNWn,t, denominated in country n’s425
currency. Then, to purchase capital, the entrepreneur borrows Bn,t = µn,tKn,t − Pn,tNWn,t units from the426
households in their country. The nominal interest rate on business loans equals the nominal interest rate427
on government bonds times an external finance premium F (λn,t) ≡ Fn,t with F ′ and F ′′ > 0 and F (1) = 1.428
Here, λn,t =
µn,tKn,t
Pn,tNWn,t
is the leverage ratio. The interest rate is then (1 + in,t)Fn,t. The function F (·)429
implies that entrepreneurs who are more highly leveraged pay a higher interest rate.430
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At the beginning of period t + 1, entrepreneurs earn a utilization-adjusted rental price of capital net431
of capital taxes (1 − τKn )un,t+1Rn,t+1 and then sell the undepreciated capital back to the households at432
the capital price µn,t+1. Depreciation costs are tax deductible. Varying the utilization of capital requires433
Kn,ta (un,t+1) units of the final good. Each period, a fraction (1− γn) of the entrepreneurs’ net worth is434
transferred to the households. We set γn =
β
Fn
so that net worth is constant in a stationary equilibrium.435
Each period, entrepreneurs chooseKn,t+1 and utilization un,t+1 to maximize expected net worthNWn,t+1.436
Net worth evolves over time according to437
NWn,t+1
γn
= Kn,t
[
(1− τKn )un,t+1
Rn,t+1
Pn,t+1
+
µn,t+1
Pn,t+1
(1− δ(1− τKn ))− a (un,t+1)
]
− (1 + in,t)Fn,t
Pn,t+1
Bn,t. (29)
The utilization choice requires the first-order condition438
(1− τKn )
Rn,t
Pn,t
= a′ (un,t) . (30)
Following Christiano et al. (2005) it is assumed that the utilization cost function is a (u) = R¯P [exp {h (u− 1)} − 1] 1h439
where the curvature parameter h governs how costly it is to increase or decrease utilization from its steady440
state value of u¯ = 1.441
The first-order condition for the choice of Kn,t requires442
µn,t(1 + in,t)Fn,t
Pn,t+1
=
∑
st+1
pi(st+1|st)
[
(1− τKn )un,t+1
Rn,t+1
Pn,t+1
+
µn,t+1
Pn,t+1
(
1− δ(1− τKn )
)
− a (un,t+1)
]
. (31)
As is standard in financial accelerator models, the external finance premium Fn,t drives a wedge between443
the nominal interest rate on bonds and the expected nominal return on capital. Notice that if Fn,t = 1 then444
we obtain the standard efficient outcome in which the market price of capital is the discounted stream of445
rental prices.446
4.4. Government Policy447
Government purchases follow an auto-regressive process448
Gn,t = (1− ρG) G¯n + ρGGn,t−1 + εGn,t, (32)
where G¯n indicates the steady-state level of government purchases. The government raises revenue by449
imposing taxes on consumption, labor income, capital income and monopoly profits at constant rates. In450
periods where revenue falls short of expenditures, the government imposes a lump sum tax on households.7451
The government splits its purchases across the final good and the domestically produced intermediate452
good. We denote by υn the share of government purchases that falls on the intermediate good. If υn > 0,453
government purchases exhibit a stronger home bias than private consumption and investment. Below, υn is454
calibrated to match the oberseved (country-specific) home bias of government purchases.455
In countries with floating exchange rates, monetary policy is conducted through a Taylor Rule that456
targets the nominal interest rate. The Taylor Rule has the form457
1 + in,t = φi (1 + in,t−1) + (1− φi)
[(
GDPn,t
GDPn
)φGDP
(pin,t)
φpi + ı¯n
]
+ εin,t, (33)
where GDPn,t is country n’s real GDP, GDPn its steady-state value, pin,t is country n’s inflation and ı¯n is458
the steady-state nominal interest rate. For simplicity the reaction parameters φGDP , φpi and φi are assumed459
to be common across countries.460
7According to our specification for hand-to-mouth consumers, a fall in government spending is not directly offset by lower
taxes for hand-to-mouth consumers. We believe that this is a reasonable depiction of fiscal policy during the austerity period
in Europe 2010-2014. Table A2a in the Appendix shows that forecast errors of government purchases were not positively, and
if anything, were negatively correlated with forecast errors of tax rates.
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Countries in the euro area have a fixed nominal exchange rate for every country in the union and a461
common nominal interest rate. The monetary authority for the countries within the euro area (the ECB)462
has a Taylor Rule similar to (33) with the exception that monetary policy reacts to the GDP-weighted463
average of innovations in GDP and inflation for the countries in the union. By definition, the countries that464
peg their exchange rate to the euro adjust their policy to keep the bilateral exchange rate towards the euro465
constant.466
4.5. Aggregation and Market Clearing467
For each country n, aggregate production of the tradable intermediate goods is (up to a first-order468
approximation) given by469
Qn,t = Zn (un,tKn,t−1)
α
L1−αn,t . (34)
Market clearing for the intermediate goods produced by country n is470
Qn,t =
 N∑
j=1
Nj
Nn
ynj,t
+ υnGn,t. (35)
The market clearing condition for the final good is471
Yn,t = Cn,t +Xn,t + (1− υn)Gn,t + a (un,t)Kn,t−1. (36)
Finally, the bond market clearing conditions require472
N∑
n=1
NnSjn,t =
N∑
n=1
Nnbn(st, st+1) = 0 ∀j, st+1. (37)
Since final goods are not traded, net exports are comprised entirely of intermediate goods. For each country473
n, nominal net exports are the value of production less the value of domestic absorption:474
NXn,t = pn,t (Qn,t − υnGn,t)− Pn,tYn,t, (38)
where the second equality follows from the zero profit condition for the final goods producers. Then, nominal475
GDP can be written as476
NGDPn,t = pn,tQn,t = NXn,t + Pn,t [Cn,t +Xn,t +Gn,t + a (un,t)Kn,t] . (39)
Real GDP is GDPn,t = p¯nQn,t, i.e. it is calculated using a fixed price deflator in which the base year prices477
are chosen as corresponding to the steady state).478
4.6. Steady state and Calibration479
The model is solved with a first-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions around the model’s480
non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation. Table 4 provides a summary of the benchmark parameters.481
Preferences. The subjective time discount factor β is set to imply a long run real annual interest rate482
of four percent. We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ to 0.50 and the Frisch elasticity of483
labor supply η to 1. These values are comparable to findings in the microeconomic literature on preference484
parameters (e.g. Barsky et al., 1997) and are fairly standard in the macroeconomic literature (e.g. Nakamura485
and Steinsson, 2014; Hall, 2009). We set the share of hand-to-mouth consumers to χ = 0.5. This is the486
value proposed in the original study by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and is consistent with the calibration487
in Martin and Philippon (2017).488
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Technology. The capital share parameter α is set to 0.38, as in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) who match data489
for 14 European countries and the US. The quarterly depreciation rate is set to 2.8 percent to match the490
share of private investment in final demand, Xn/Yn.491
The form of the investment adjustment cost f (·) implies a relationship between investment growth and492
Tobin’s Q. We adopt the value f ′′(1) = 2.48 from Christiano et al. (2005) which implies that a one percent493
increase in Q causes investment to increase by roughly 0.4 percent. For the utilization cost function the494
elasticity of utilization with respect to the real rental price of capital is governed by the parameter h = a
′′(1)
a′(1) .495
We follow Del Negro et al. (2013) by setting h = 0.286. This implies that a one percent increase in the real496
rental price Rn/Pn causes an increase in the capital utilization rate of 0.286 percent.497
Financial Market Imperfections. In the steady state, the nominal prices of capital and the final consumption498
good are equal. The entrepreneurs’ optimal choice for capital implies that499
1
β
F¯n =
(
1− τKn
) R¯n
P¯n
+
(
1− δ (1− τKn )) , (40)
where steady state interest rate spreads are F¯n ≡ Fn
(
λ¯n
)
. These external finance premia are calculated500
as the average spread between lending rates (to non-financial corporations) and central bank interest rates.501
For every country, we calculate an average for 2005. The data source for the spread data is the ECB for euro502
area countries, the Global Financial Database and national central banks for the remaining countries.Given503
values for F¯n, the equation above determines the real rental price of capital R¯n/P¯n in each country.504
The elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to leverage F is 0.025, implying that an505
increase in the leverage ratio of 10 percent raises the annual spread by 1 percentage point. This value is506
in the middle range of values used in the literature.8 The calibration for the leverage ratio levn adopts the507
value from Brave et al. (2012) for the U.S (lev = 2.11).508
Trade and Country Size. We choose parameters to ensure that all real exchange rates e¯j,n ≡ E¯jE¯n
p¯j
p¯n
are 1 in509
steady state. With e¯j,n = 1 for all j, n it is straightforward to show that the price of the final consumption510
good and the price of the tradable intermediate good are equal, P¯n = p¯n. With zero inflation, the price of511
intermediates is a constant markup over nominal marginal cost, p¯n =
ψq
ψq−1MCn. Bilateral import ratios512
satisfy
y¯jn
Y¯n
= ωjn, and are calibrated to the share of imports y
j
n in the production of the final good, Yn. We513
use data from the OECD on trade in value added (TiVA). TiVA has information on the value added content514
of final demand by source country for all country pairs in our data sample. We directly use these values for515
yjn and the implied final demand value for Yn to calculate ω
j
n for all country pairs using averages for 2005516
and 2010.517
In addition to matching the import ratios, we also calibrate the model to match observed relative country518
sizes,
Nj Y¯j
NnY¯n taken from the TiVA tables. Taken together this ensures that the shares of net exports relative519
to domestic absorbtion NXn/Y¯n are matched.520
The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, ψy, is set to 0.5. This is comparable to521
parameter values used in international business cycle models with trade. In their original paper, Heathcote522
and Perri (2002) estimated ψy = 0.90. Using firm-level data, Cravino (2017) and Proebsting (2015) find523
elasticities close to 1.5. We consider higher elasticities in the sensitivity analysis below.524
Price Rigidity. The Calvo price setting hazard is set to roughly match observed frequencies of price adjust-525
ment in the micro data. In their sample of European countries, Alvarez et al. (2006) find that the average526
duration of prices is 13 months. This corresponds to θ = 0.80 for a quarterly model.527
8In Bernanke et al. (1999), the calibration of parameters implies an elasticity of 0.05. Del Negro et al. (2013) estimate an
elasticity of 0.08, whereas Brave et al. (2012) estimate an elasticity of 0.002.
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Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Steady-state values of government purchases, G¯n, are set to match each coun-528
try’s average value from 2000-2010. The share of government purchases that directly falls on the intermediate529
good, υn, is chosen to match the observed import shares of government purchases. We take these shares530
from the World Input Output Database (it is not available in the TiVA database). On average, the value531
for υn is 0.86, indicating that government purchases exhibit a stronger home bias than private purchases.532
The persistence of the government purchase shock is set to 0.93, which corresponds to a half life of533
2.5 years. This is in line with fiscal consolidation plans laid out by governments around 2009, where most534
consolidation measures were to be implemented until 2012 (see Forthun et al., 2011).535
We use implicit tax rates to calibrate the values for τCn , τ
L
n and τ
K
n , and set the profit tax rate equal536
to the capital tax rate, τΠn = τ
K
n . Calculation of tax rates for consumption, labor and capital builds on537
Mendoza et al. (1994) and Eurostat (2014) and are based on data from the National Tax Lists. Compared538
to statutory tax rates, the advantages of these rates are that they take into account the net effect of existing539
rules regarding exemptions and deductions. We use the average over 2005 through 2009. Table A9 in the540
Appendix includes a list of all countries, implicit tax rates, shares of government purchases in GDP, import541
shares of government purchases and financial market spreads.542
We choose our Taylor rule parameters to be φpi = 1.5, φGDP = 0.5 and φi = 0.75, which is in line with543
estimates by Clarida et al. (2000).544
4.7. Forcing Variables545
Our approach is to treat the austerity forecast deviations calculated in Section 3 as structural shocks.546
In addition to the austerity shocks, the model features monetary policy shocks.547
Austerity Shocks. Government purchase shocks are based on forecast errors from equation (1). Annual548
forecast errors are interpolated to quarterly series using the Chow-Lin method (Chow and Lin, 1971).549
Monetary Policy Shocks. To measure monetary policy shocks we estimate a generalized Taylor rule of the550
form suggested by Clarida et al. (2000):551
in,t = φiit−1 + (1− φi)
[
rn + φpi (pin,t − pi∗n) + φGDP
(
lnGDPn,t − lnGDPn,t
)]
+ εin,t, (41)
where in,t is the nominal (annualized) interest rate, rn is the long-run (annualized) interest rate, pin,t is552
(annualized) inflation, pi∗n is the inflation target, lnGDPn,t − lnGDPn,t is the log deviation of real GDP553
from its trend, and εin,t is a structural shock. We impose the values φi = 0.75, φpi = 1.5 and φGDP = 0.5554
from our calibration and then estimate the intercept for each of the central banks in our model that have an555
independent monetary policy. Given our estimates of the intercepts, the monetary policy shocks can then556
be recovered as εˆin,t = in,t − ıˆn,t.557
5. Model and Data Comparison558
In this section, we feed the estimated structural shocks for the 2005-2014 period into the model and559
compare simulated data with actual data.560
5.1. Benchmark Model Performance561
The benchmark model includes austerity shocks and monetary policy shocks for the baseline calibration562
given in Table 4. Table 3 shows a comparison of the cross-sectional OLS estimates on austerity for the period563
2010-2014 generated by the model and the data. Overall, the coefficients from the model (the middle set of564
columns labeled “Benchmark”) are consistent with the estimates from the data in terms of magnitude and565
sign. Empirically, the coefficient on GDP is 1.77; the corresponding coefficient in the model is 1.94. Both566
in the data and the model the response of GDP to austerity is somewhat weaker for floating exchange rate567
countries. The response of inflation to government purchase shortfalls is 0.44 in the data and 0.39 in the568
model (that is, austerity is associated with deflation). The inflation response is somewhat greater for fixed569
exchange rate countries and weaker for floating exchange rate countries in both the data and the model.570
The model also does a reasonable job at explaining consumption and investment behavior, although the571
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magnitudes in the model fall a bit short of the empirical estimate for investment. In both the model and572
the data, austerity shocks generate a positive response of net exports.573
Figure 4 compares scatterplots of actual data for GDP, net exports and inflation (the left panels) with574
scatterplots of the corresponding simulated data (the right panels).9 In each panel, the austerity shocks575
(i.e., forecast errors) are on the horizontal axis. The units of both axes are log points times 100, so they can576
be interpreted as roughly corresponding to percent changes. The panels include the regression line for the577
entire sample.578
The scatterplots reveal several differences between the actual data and the simulated data. First, the579
actual data have more noise than the simulated data. This is due to the fact that the model includes only580
a limited number of shocks. Given this limited number of shocks, it is almost surprising that our model581
can generate dispersion in inflation, especially across countries that share the same currency. Part of this582
dispersion stems from the household’s and particularly the government’s home bias in their domestic final583
good, which breaks the law of one price; part of it can also be attributed to asymmetries across countries584
(e.g. tax rates and bilateral trade flows).585
Second, while our model does a reasonably good job replicating the cross-sectional dispersion in GDP—586
as illustrated by the same slope of the regression line in the data and the model—it underestimates the587
overall drop in GDP in Europe observed in the data (reflected in the intercept in Figure 4). One possible588
reason for this difference could be due to the monetary policy response in the model. The model assumes589
that monetary authorities lower nominal interest rates in response to falling GDP and prices, thereby590
counteracting austerity. If instead, monetary authorities were at the zero lower bound (ZLB), they could not591
implement this policy to offset the impact of the austerity shock. Such a ZLB constraint would amplify the592
effects of austerity on GDP, as discussed e.g. by Eggertsson (2011), Christiano et al. (2011) and Blanchard593
et al. (2016). We return to the issue of the ZLB later. Alternatively, the general fall in GDP across European594
countries could be attributed to faltering economic conditions outside of Europe or other conditions that595
affected all European countries, but are not captured by our model (see e.g. Kollmann et al., 2016).596
The last three columns of Table 3 report the results when monetary policy shocks are removed. This597
leaves the coefficients virtually unchanged for countries in the euro area. Removing monetary shocks for598
floating exchange rate countries, however, reduces the cross-sectional coefficient on output for this country599
group by more than a third. This indicates that countries with floating exchange rates that implemented600
austere policies also conducted contractionary monetary policy, further deepening the recessionary effect.601
Without monetary policy shocks, the coefficient for floating exchange rate countries falls to 1.00, half the602
size of the coefficient for fixed exchange rate countries. This is in line with studies emphasizing the strong603
effects of fiscal policy in currency unions (see e.g. Farhi and Werning, 2016).604
As emphasized in the discussion of the empirical results in Section 2, it is possible that the observed605
relationship between spending and output is driven by some third variable that is correlated with both.606
Here we consider the effects of several other potential shocks that could drive changes in economic activity.607
We examine shocks to monetary policy, financial markets, consumption taxes (VAT), labor taxes, capital608
taxes and TFP. For each shock, we simulate the model and compare the model-generated variables with the609
data. Table 5 reports pseudo-R2 measures of fit, given by610
pseudo-R2 = 1−
∑N
i=1
(
x˜datai,2010−2014 − x˜modeli,2010−2014
)2∑N
i=1
(
x˜datai,2010−2014
)2 (42)
for each variable x. If any one of the shocks in the table, such as TFP, were responsible for the economic611
performance in Europe, one would expect the fit of the model-generated data to actual data to be good.612
A perfect fit would result in a pseudo-R2 measure of 1.00. Column (1) in the table reports the fit for the613
benchmark model which includes two shocks: austerity shocks and monetary shocks. For most variables the614
9Note, the plot of the actual data conditions on total revenue, TFP and government debt to GDP (i.e., specification 11 in
Table 1b). That is, we plot
(
G˜n, Y˜n − Γˆ · controlsn
)
. We do not include the controls in the model regressions because the
model does not include shocks to TFP, shocks to tax rates, or endogenous responses of policy to debt-to-GDP ratios.
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fit is quite good with the main exception being the fit for GDP growth and the exchange rate. Column615
(2) shows that the fit remains good if we confine our attention to austerity shocks alone. Columns (3)–(8)616
report the fit for other shocks. These measures are uniformly poor indicating that none of these other617
shocks would produce patterns like those observed in the data. Perhaps the most consequential of these618
shocks is the financial market shock which has an R2 with GDP of 0.22. This is still not as informative619
as the austerity shocks which have an R2 of 0.67. Surprisingly, the tax shocks and TFP shocks actually620
have negative pseudo-R2’s indicating that they produce results that are at odds with the observations.621
The high pseudo-R2 measures for austerity shocks gives us confidence that, while we cannot claim to have622
econometrically identified exogenous shocks to government spending, austerity seems to be the most likely623
cause of the variation in recovery paths observed across Europe.624
Summing up our results so far, our benchmark model including both austerity shocks and monetary policy625
shocks can replicate the cross-sectional patterns of observed macroeconomic aggregates and prices. Monetary626
policy shocks are only important for explaining the variation among floating exchange rate countries. The627
model underestimates the general fall in GDP observed in Europe between 2010 and 2014.628
5.2. Inspecting the Mechanism629
Several features of the model work together to generate the relatively large effects of austerity observed630
in the data. Here we analyze the mechanisms in the model that produce this effect. Table 6 reports results631
for nine different model specifications and compares the results with the data. The table reports results632
for all countries as well as results for fixed and floating exchange rate countries separately. The empirical633
estimates are reported in column (1) in the table. Column (2) reports the results for our benchmark model.634
Columns (3) - (9) report results for other model specifications.635
A reduction in government purchases reduces demand for the domestic final good. In many models,636
reductions in government purchases cause output to fall by less than the reduction in spending; i.e., the637
spending multiplier is often less than one. Here, several mechanisms act to magnify the reaction of output638
to a change in government spending. These mechanisms include the share of hand-to-mouth consumers,639
the financial accelerator, the trade elasticity and the trade share of government purchases. In the table, we640
examine how each of these features changes the effects of austerity in the model.641
Column (3) shows the results when we relax the assumption of GHH preferences, and instead assume642
preferences that are separable in consumption and leisure. Under separable preferences the cross-sectional643
coefficient falls from 1.94 to 1.60, with most of the difference due to a weaker response of consumption644
spending. GHH preferences play a somewhat less prominent role in our setting relative to Nakamura and645
Steinsson (2014) for two reasons. First, the labor-consumption complementarities are weakened by steady-646
state distortions in the form of taxes on consumption and labor. These taxes reduce the fall in consumption647
demand by households in response to the drop in employment, as emphasized most recently by Auclert and648
Rognlie (2017).10 Second, labor-consumption complementarieties have a weaker effect in our model because649
aggregate demand also depends on the response of investment while in Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) all650
of net output is used for consumption.651
Like GHH preferences, the hand-to-mouth restriction helps the model produce a negative response of652
consumption to austerity. In the model, a decrease in government purchases leads to a drop in income, which653
directly reduces hand-to-mouth consumption (see also Gal´ı et al., 2007). Eliminating the hand-to-mouth654
constraint (column (4)) lowers the coefficient for output to 1.38, again mainly due to a weak response in655
consumption.11656
10Auclert and Rognlie (2017) show that in a closed-economy New Keynesian model without capital, the government spending
multiplier under a constant real interest rate rule equals the inverse of the labor wedge. In our model, the labor wedge equals
1 − 1−τ
l
n
1−τcn
ψq−1
ψq
, which, for the average country in our model, equals 0.5. This implies a multiplier of 2. Adding capital and
adopting a Taylor rule as in our model would yield a multiplier significantly smaller than 1.
11We assume the same share of hand-to-mouth consumers across countries. Martin and Philippon (2017) report country-
specific hand-to-mouth ratios for eleven countries in the euro area. Using these country-specific shares increases the estimated
coefficient for the fixed exchange rate countries somewhat, mostly because the estimates by Martin and Philippon (2017)
suggest that austere countries had particularly high shares of hand-to-mouth consumers.
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The financial accelerator allows us to match the observed fall in investment. As output falls, en-657
trepreneurs’ net worth declines, which in turn increases the external finance premium they face for purchases658
of new capital. Column (5) shows that investment is nearly unresponsive to austerity shocks in the absence659
of the financial accelerator mechanism. Without the financial accelerator, the coefficient on investment660
would be −0.09 instead of −0.93 in our benchmark specification.661
Columns (6) and (7) illustrate the influence of monetary policy on the cross-sectional effects of austerity.662
Column (6) shows results for a case of more accomodative monetary policy in which Taylor rule parameters663
are reduced to φGDP = φpi − 1 = 0.1. The effects of austerity for the fixed exchange rate countries change664
only slightly. As emphasized by Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), the stance of monetary policy has little665
effect on the cross-sectional coefficient in a monetary union. For countries outside the currency union, the666
change to the Taylor rule increases the output coefficient from 1.56 to 2.55. This is because the monetary667
authorities outside the euro area are now less responsive to country-specific austerity shocks; this results in668
larger output losses and more deflation.669
Column (7) examines the case where the ECB is constrained by a zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal670
interest rate. To introduce a constant nominal interest rate for the ECB, we add a (large) fictional country671
to the model. This fictional country does not participate in the market for tradable goods but it does have672
a fixed exchange rate with the euro. Importantly, this external economy follows a Taylor rule and sets673
interest rates for itself and all the countries in the euro area. This country is sufficiently large to ensure674
that changes in inflation and output within the euro area do not have a perceptible feedback on the interest675
rate, thus even though there are significant fiscal shocks in the euro area, the interest rate for the euro676
does not react.12 The monetary policy rules for the countries outside the euro remain the same. The ZLB677
specification has essentially no effect on the cross-sectional output coefficients for the countries within the678
euro. On the other hand, the ZLB does imply that the countries in the euro area suffer greater output losses679
as a group. Figure 5 shows scatter plots of austerity and GDP for both our benchmark model (solid dots)680
and the specification with the ZLB (open dots) for the fixed exchange rate countries. The reaction of GDP681
to austerity in each country is indeed greater under the ZLB. For instance, Portugal (PRT) experienced682
a reduction in government spending of roughly 6 percent of GDP. Away from the ZLB, Portugal’s GDP683
falls by about 10 percent. At the ZLB, the decline is roughly 16 percent. In contrast, the cross-sectional684
relationship is unchanged.685
To summarize, several amplification mechanisms generate large effects of austerity in the cross-section.686
Labor-consumption complementarities, hand-to-mouth consumers, and the financial accelerator make aggre-687
gate consumption and investment demand more responsive to changes in current income. Because monetary688
policy is the same across the euro area, variations in monetary policy (including the ZLB) leave the implied689
cross-sectional effect of austerity unchanged.690
5.3. The Effects of Austerity in Integrated Economies691
The countries in our model are linked by trade, capital markets, and, for some countries, a shared692
monetary policy. In a closed economy, all of the adjustment to changes in government spending must be693
borne by domestic firms and consumers. In an open economy, some of the adjustment is absorbed by foreign694
trading partners and exchange rate adjustments, both of which serve to reduce the impact of austerity.695
Because our model is calibrated to observed trade shares, there will be cross-country heterogeneity in the696
impact of austerity on economic activity and the magnitude of spillover effects.697
Column (8) of Table 6 considers the consequences of a higher elasticity of substitution between home698
and foreign goods (ψy = 2 instead of ψy = 0.5). The higher elasticity makes it easier to export excess supply699
of the home good, reducing the effect on GDP and increasing the effect on net exports. Our benchmark700
specification assumes that government purchases are primarily comprised of domestic goods and services701
12We set the size of this fictional country to be 1 million times the size of Europe. As discussed in Nakamura and Steinsson
(2014), this specification is not the same as a ZLB in a closed economy model. While the fictional external economy does
eliminate movements in the nominal interest rate across countries, it does not feature a long-run drop in the nominal price
level. That is, prices in the euro area must return to the steady state after the shocks have subsided. In a specification of the
ZLB that did allow for long-run deflation, the effects of the ZLB would be even more pronounced.
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while private consumption and investment goods have higher import shares. In column (9), we reduce the702
home bias of government expenditures to that of consumption and investment (υ = 0) keeping overall import703
shares unchanged. With this increase in openness, the output coefficient falls from 1.94 to 1.63.704
The multi-country model reveals that there is a strong negative relationship between the effect of austerity705
on domestic production and import shares within the currency union. Figure 6 illustrates this relationship706
by plotting domestic multipliers against each country’s import share. We calculate the multiplier as the707
change in a country’s GDP in response to an increase of domestic government purchases by 1 percent of708
GDP during the 2010 - 2014 period, holding spending in other countries constant. This figure makes three709
points. First, the figure shows that there is substantial variation in domestic multipliers across Europe710
due to differences in trade openness. Second, for countries with fixed exchange rates, there is an inverse711
relationship between the impact of government spending and the import share. Larger import shares imply712
that part of the increased demand due to stimulus would be met by an increase in imports.13 Third, holding713
import shares fixed, there remains a clear difference between the economies within the euro and economies714
with floating exchange rates. Countries with floating exchange rates experience offsetting adjustments to715
monetary policy, weakening the effect of austerity. There is an adjustment in monetary policy in the euro716
area but, since it is responding to euro-area wide GDP, the offsetting effects are much smaller and thus the717
impact of austerity remains large.718
Openness to trade is also important for spillover effects from austerity. To illustrate the extent of spillovers719
we consider the impact of changes in government spending in the rest of Europe assuming that there is no720
change in domestic government spending. Figure 7 includes results both with (the dark heavy bar) and721
without the ZLB (the thin light bar). For example, assuming the euro is at the ZLB, if the rest of Europe722
increased spending by 1 percent of European GDP, Greek GDP would increase by 0.8 percent. This occurs723
because demand for Greek exports increases with European demand. On the other hand, if monetary policy724
in Europe adjusts to the increase in government spending, then Greek output falls by nearly 1.5 percent725
(the thick dark bar). This is because the contractionary effects of monetary policy outweigh the spillover726
effects operating through trade. (Recall that Greece has a relatively small import share.) For countries727
with higher trade shares, such as Luxembourg, the spillover effect through trade becomes stronger. This728
finding is consistent with estimated regional spillover effects of government spending, particularly during729
recessions (see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013). Finally, the economies with floating exchange rates730
all experience contractions. The increased demand in Europe causes input prices to rise across the region.731
For the floating exchange rate economies, monetary policy reacts to this imported inflation by raising interest732
rates, which reduces GDP.733
6. Counterfactual Policy Simulations734
We next use the model to analyze two counterfactual scenarios. The first experiment considers the effect735
of eliminating austerity in Europe. The second examines the effect of eliminating the common currency and736
instead having country specific monetary policy with floating exchange rates.737
Europe Without Austerity. The “No Austerity” experiment removes all negative government spending shocks738
from our benchmark model. For this experiment, we impose the ZLB in both the benchmark model and739
the counterfactual simulation. We do this because, while the ZLB has only a minimal impact on the cross-740
sectional performance of the model, it has a much larger impact on the simulated time series paths.741
The two leftmost panels of Figure 8 show the actual and simulated time paths for GDP for the EU10742
(the upper panel) and GIIPS (the lower panel). We include results for both the benchmark specification743
and the “No Austerity” counterfactual. The figure underscores our main result that fiscal austerity has744
large contractionary effects on output. The benchmark model under the ZLB tracks the data for the GIIPS745
economies quite well but less so for the EU10. Actual GDP falls by almost 17 percent in the GIIPS economies746
13For floating exchange rate countries, the relationship is less clear and might even be positive, similar to the finding in
Cacciatore and Traum (2018).
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and by 18 percent in the benchmark model. In contrast, when austerity is eliminated, output in the GIIPS747
group would have increased by roughly one percent.14 EU10 output in the “No Austerity” counterfactual748
exceeds EU10 output in the benchmark by roughly 8 percent.749
Notice that in the figures, the actual data display sharp downturns in GDP in 2008-2009 while the model750
predicts expansions. The expansion in the model is due to stimulative monetary and fiscal policy shocks751
which are reflected in the forcing variables we feed in to the simulation. The model does not include the752
collapse in house prices, and credit market failures that caused the Great Recession. Our focus is on the753
post-crisis period starting in 2010.754
A significant motivation for austerity policies was to slow the escalation of debt-to-GDP ratios that755
occurred across the euro area. While reductions in government expenditures should, all else equal, reduce756
deficits and debt levels over time, the impact on the debt-to-GDP ratio is not obvious. As our previous757
analysis shows, reductions in government expenditures have a considerable negative impact on economic758
activity, and this will in turn reduce tax revenues. Furthermore, trade linkages and shared monetary policy759
in Europe mean that fiscal actions in one country will be transmitted to neighboring countries, affecting760
their fiscal positions.761
Strictly speaking, the model does not feature any government debt because we assume that the govern-762
ment balances its budget through lump-sum taxes every period. We can however, calculate the cumulative763
change in tax liabilities implied by the model during the 2010-2014 period. Debt in each period is the differ-764
ence between government expenditures and tax revenue collected through the VAT, the labor tax and the765
capital tax. For the average country in our sample, these tax rates—reported in Table A9 in the Appendix—766
are 21 percent, 33 percent and 26 percent, respectively. For each period, we cumulate all of the debt from the767
start of the simulation and report it as a ratio to GDP. Notice that this is the debt-to-GDP ratio excluding768
interest payments. A potential limitation of this approach is that we abstract from endogenous changes in769
sovereign risk premia. To the extent that some countries faced escalating interest rate premia in 2010-2014770
our exclusion of interest payments on the debt may be understating the full impact of austerity on a nation’s771
debt trajectory. Whether investors took austerity measures as a positive or a negative signal with regard to772
debt sustainability remains an open question (see e.g. Born et al., 2014).773
The middle panels in Figure 8 show the actual and simulated time paths for the debt-to-GDP ratio774
relative to its end of 2009 value. The grey line shows the actual path of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the data.775
The light, dotted line is a “static” estimate that assumes that GDP and tax revenue are unaffected by776
changes in government purchases, and thus reflects only the direct effects of reduced government spending.777
According to this static measure, austerity undertaken by the GIIPS countries should have resulted in a778
decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio by more than 20 percentage points from 2009 to 2014 for the GIIPS region.779
In contrast, our benchmark model with the ZLB predicts an increase of 17 percentage points, roughly as780
large as that observed in the data.781
The strong discrepancy between the “static” debt-to-GDP ratio and the benchmark debt-to-GDP ratio782
is driven by three endogenous responses captured by our model: First, fiscal consolidations cause reductions783
in GDP. Second, at the ZLB, austerity abroad further reduces GDP. Third, these reductions in GDP lead784
to lower tax revenues. All these effects lead to an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.785
Looking at the euro area as a whole, our model suggests that austerity during the 2010-2014 period was786
“self-defeating” in the sense that debt-to-GDP ratios rose in response to the observed cuts in government787
spending. This is reminiscent of DeLong and Summers (2012) and Denes et al. (2013) who argue that a788
cut in government spending can perversely boost debt levels during a liquidity trap. Indeed, the empirical789
analysis in Fata´s and Summers (2018) suggests that austerity in Europe caused debt-to-gdp ratios to rise790
as they do in our quantitative framework.791
Figure 8 shows that debt-to-GDP ratios would have been lower in the euro area had no country im-792
plemented austerity. A separate question is whether austerity implemented by individual countries was793
self-defeating. To get at this question, we simulate our benchmark model (with the ZLB) for each country794
14While we do not include an explicit sovereign risk premium in the model, the financial accelerator creates interest rate
spreads in the countries that experienced austerity, exacerbating any reductions in output.
21
assuming that all other countries pursue austerity but the country itself does not. E.g., for Greece we would795
eliminate austerity in Greece but continue to have austerity in all other countries. The dark bars in Figure796
9 correspond to the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio for each country for the benchmark simulation with797
austerity across Europe. The light bars correspond to the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio for each country798
when all other countries pursue austerity.799
The figure reveals that spillovers coming from other countries’ austerity measures led to an increase of800
the debt-to-GDP ratio of about 8 percentage points for the typical country in the euro area. For some801
countries, these spillovers—as opposed to domestic austerity—were the main reason why debt ratios went802
up. For other countries, domestic austerity also played a role: For Greece, the model indicates that domestic803
austerity raised Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio by 35 percentage points, whereas domestic austerity in Ireland804
reduced Ireland’s debt-to-GDP ratio by about 8 percentage points. Austerity was therefore self-defeating805
for only some countries (like Greece), but not all. This large variation across countries partially reflects the806
size of the austerity packages, but also initial debt-to-GDP positions and the size of the domestic multipliers807
depicted in Figure 6.808
Europe Without the Euro. The third set of panels in Figure 8 show output trajectories for a “No Euro”809
experiment. In this counterfactual, the countries experienced austerity shocks but were free to pursue810
independent monetary policy and allow their currencies to float. Unlike the previous counterfactual, we do811
not impose the ZLB for this experiment.15 While there are many ramifications of such an “exit strategy” from812
the euro that are not captured in our model, the experiment does provide some insight into the opportunity813
cost of a shared monetary policy. Although the effects of allowing countries to pursue independent monetary814
policy are more modest than eliminating austerity, they do suggest that both the EU10 and the GIIPS815
economies in particular would benefit from moving to an independent, unconstrained monetary policy. By816
the end of 2014, their GDP would have been 3 and 8 percentage points, respectively, higher relative to817
the benchmark. In this scenario, central banks in both regions would lower their nominal interest rates818
to counterbalance austerity. The consequent fall in nominal exchange rates would stimulate exports and819
output.16820
7. Conclusion821
Since the end of the Great Recession in 2009, advanced economies have experienced radically different822
recoveries. Some enjoyed a return to normal economic growth following the financial crisis while others823
have suffered through prolonged periods of low employment and low growth. We have attempted to make824
sense of this diversity of experiences by examining cross-country variation in economic activity empirically825
and through the lens of a dynamic general equilibrium model. Despite substantial noise in the data, clear826
patterns emerge. Taken as a whole, we conclude that differences in austerity played an important role in827
accounting for differences in economic performance across countries. Specifically, contractions in government828
purchases are strongly associated with reductions in output.829
We use a multi-country DSGE model to see whether standard macroeconomic theory can explain the830
observed changes in economic activity. The model features government purchases shocks and monetary831
shocks and allows us to make direct comparisons between the observed empirical relationships in the data832
and the model’s predictions. The model is calibrated to match the main features of the European countries833
in our dataset including country size, trade flows and exchange rate regimes. The model output broadly834
matches the patterns observed in the data. In particular, the model successfully reproduces the large835
estimated impact of austerity on output.836
We use the model to conduct a number of counterfactual experiments. Our analysis suggests that837
austerity was a substantial drag on GDP, especially for the GIIPS countries. Economic integration has two838
15Although the euro area itself was close to the ZLB during the European debt crisis, we assume here that, after a breakup
of the euro area, monetary authorities would be able to devalue their currencies. Amador et al. (2017) show that monetary
authorities can devalue their currencies at the ZLB by intervening in the foreign exchange market.
16See Figure A12 in the Appendix for the path of implied effective exchange rates for this experiment.
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effects on the impact of country-specific austerity on economic activity. On the one hand, trade integration839
helps to mitigate the impact of austerity through spillovers to its trading partners. On the other hand,840
because monetary policy in the euro area is common to all countries, country-specific austerity shocks have841
larger effects relative to a flexible exchange rate regime. Our analysis, which incorporates both effects,842
suggests that had countries in the euro area abstained from negative fiscal shocks, output would have been843
substantially higher and may have resulted in lower debt-to-GDP ratios in certain European countries.844
This paper emphasizes countries’ variation in response to austerity, both implemented at home and845
abroad, and links this variation to countries’ trade exposure, size, and monetary regime, among other846
factors. While the focus of our paper has been on fiscal policy, we believe that this variation in countries’847
sensitivity to economic shocks is particularly pertinent for countries in a currency union, in which monetary848
policy is substantially harder to tailor to national needs. Further investigating this variation and how it849
constrains policy choices would be a fruitful avenue for future research.850
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Table 2: FISCAL POLICY AND DEBT TO GDP
Debt to GDP 2009
All Countries Fixed XRT Floating XRT
α R2 αfix R2 αfl R2
Gov’t. Purchases 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.17 −0.03 0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Social Benefits 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Total Revenue 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.34 0.01 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Stand. VAT 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
Top Income Tax Rate 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.18 −0.05 0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.10)
Top Corp. Tax Rate −0.02 0.06 −0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Notes: Table displays the estimated coefficient of regression along the lines of (6) without any
controls, as well as its R2. The independent variable is the government debt to GDP ratio at
the end of 2009. The dependent variables are forecast errors of government purchases, social
benefits, total revenue, VAT, top income tax rates and top corporate tax rates. Regressions
are run for the whole set of countries, only fixed exchange rate countries, or only floating
exchange rate countries. Reported standard errors in parentheses are (untreated) OLS errors.
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Table 3: COMPARISON OF MODEL AND DATA
Data Benchmark Only aust. shocks
All Fix Float All Fix Float All Fix Float
GDP -1.77 -1.79 -1.70 -1.93 -2.03 -1.55 -1.76 -2.03 -1.00
(0.20) (0.24) (0.40)
Inflation -0.44 -0.57 -0.17 -0.39 -0.50 -0.11 -0.35 -0.50 0.06
(0.10) (0.12) (0.20)
Consumption -1.18 -1.20 -1.04 -1.19 -1.22 -1.02 -1.08 -1.22 -0.71
(0.18) (0.21) (0.36)
Investment -1.29 -1.43 -0.92 -0.93 -0.98 -0.72 -0.79 -0.99 -0.27
(0.16) (0.19) (0.31)
Net Exports over GDP 1.43 1.61 0.91 1.20 1.19 1.19 1.13 1.19 0.97
(0.20) (0.22) (0.37)
Exchange Rate -0.77 0.44 -2.92 -0.21 -0.11 -0.56 -0.30 -0.10 -0.90
(0.36) (0.30) (0.50)
GDP Growth -0.52 -0.50 -0.51 -0.41 -0.49 -0.18 -0.38 -0.50 -0.07
(0.08) (0.10) (0.17)
Notes: Table displays the regression coefficients on government purchases (α in regression (6) and for the coefficients
αFix and αFl for the regression with separate coefficients for fixed and floating exchange rate countries, after controlling
for government revenue, government debt and TFP as is done in specification (11) of Table 1b. Each row represents a
separate regression. The dependent variables are average forecast errors in real GDP per capita, the inflation rate based
on the Harmonized Index for Consumer Prices excluding Food and Energy, real consumption per capita, real investment
per capita, real net exports, the nominal effective exchange rate and the real per capita GDP growth rate. The net export
measure is real exports in date t, less real imports in date t divided by 2005:1 nominal GDP. We multiply real exports
and real imports by their respective deflators for 2005:1, so that for 2005:1 our measure of net exports equals nominal net
exports over nominal GDP. The coefficients αFix and αFl are estimated in a single regression, which also allows intercepts
to differ across currency regimes, but forces the coefficients on the control variables to be the same across currency regimes.
The benchmark calibration includes shocks to government spending and the Taylor rule. The last three columns display
the results if only government spending shocks are fed into the model
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Table 5: Goodness of Fit: Alternative Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mark
Bench-
shocks
Aust.
shocks
Mon. pol.
shocks
Financ.
shocks
Cons. tax
shocks
Lab. tax
shocks
Cap. tax
shocks
TFP
GDP 0.66 0.67 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.19
Inflation 0.51 0.53 −0.12 0.02 −0.66 −0.19 0.07 −1.94
Consumption 0.58 0.57 0.05 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.46
Investment 0.39 0.36 0.06 0.33 −0.05 −0.04 0.06 −0.84
Net Exports over GDP 0.72 0.72 0.06 0.20 −0.05 −0.07 0.06 −1.49
Exchange Rate 0.15 0.22 −0.12 0.01 −0.00 −0.01 0.01 −0.36
GDP Growth 0.13 0.08 0.05 −0.09 0.06 0.08 0.02 −0.10
Notes: Table presents the goodness of fit of the model for various shocks and outcome variables. The benchmark model
(column 1) includes both austerity and monetary policy shocks. The remaining columns refer to model simulations with only
one type of shock at a time. Financial shocks are shocks to the interest rate spreads for loans extended to entrepreneurs (i.e.,
interest rates paid by entrepreneurs are now given by
(
1 + in
(
st
))
F (λn
(
st
)
)e
F
n (s
t), where Fn
(
st
)
is a shock to the interest
rate spread). The tax shocks refer to consumption taxes (τC), labor taxes (τL) and capital taxes (τK). TFP shocks are shocks
to total factor productivity (Z). The goodness of fit reported for each outcome variable and each simulation is calculated as
pseudo-R2 = 1−
∑N
i=1
(
x˜datai,2010−2014−x˜modeli,2010−2014
)2
∑N
i=1
(
x˜datai,2010−2014
)2
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Figure 1: Real per Capita GDP Before, During and After the Crisis
Note: The figure plots the time paths of real per capita GDP for the period 2006:1-2014:4 for the countries in our data set.
The paths are indexed to 100 in 2009:2. The two shaded regions indicate recession dates according to the NBER and CEPR.
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Figure 2: Government Purchases and GDP
Note: Left column panels display real government purchases for various countries on a log scale (normalized to 2009=100),
together with their predicted values. Right column panels display the corresponding series for real GDP per capita.
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Figure 3: GDP and Austerity: Data
Note: Figure displays a scatter plot of the average forecast residual of GDP over 2010 - 2014, in log points, versus the average
forecast residual for austerity, defined as the shortfall in government purchases, also in log points. Countries are classified
by their exchange rate regime (red: euro / pegged to euro; black: floating currency). See text for details on the forecast
specification.
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Figure 5: GDP and Austerity: Without and With ZLB
Note: Figure displays a scatter plot of the average forecast residual of GDP over 2010 - 2014, in log points, versus the
average forecast residual for austerity, defined as the shortfall in government purchases, also in log points. Sample only includes
countries with fixed exchange rates. Red dots refer to simulated data under the benchmark calibration; blue dots refer to
simulated data under the benchmark calibration with a ZLB for the ECB.
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Figure 6: Domestic Multiplier and Import Share
Note: Figure plots domestic multipliers vs. a country’s steady-state import share. The domestic multiplier is calculated as
the average 2010 - 2014 GDP deviation (relative to the benchmark) in a counterfactual experiment, where the country that
is plotted raises its government purchases by 1 percent of GDP. Hence, every dot corresponds to a different simulation. The
model includes the ZLB specification for the ECB.
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Figure 7: Spillover of Government Purchases
Note: Figure displays the average 2010 - 2014 GDP deviation predicted by the model in a counterfactual experiment relative
to the benchmark model. In the counterfactual experiment, all countries in Europe raise their government purchases during
the 2010 - 2014 period, except for the country whose GDP is plotted. Hence, every bar corresponds to a different simulation.
The total increase in government purchases abroad is always set to 1 percent of European GDP for every year in 2010-2014,
implying that countries have to raise their government purchases by more the larger the country that does not raise its
government purchases. For a given experiment, the percent increase in government purchases is the same across all foreign
countries. The thin light bars correspond to the scenario where a ZLB is imposed for the euro area.
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Figure 9: Debt-to-GDP Ratios in Counterfactuals
Note: Figure displays the percentage point change of the debt-to-GDP ratio (excluding interest payments) between the end of
2009 and the end of 2014 based on model simulations. The model includes the ZLB specification for the ECB. The dark heavy
bars correspond to the benchmark model. The light thin bars are derived from a model simulation, where all countries receive
the same shocks as in our benchmark model, except for the country whose debt-to-GDP ratio is plotted. That country is not
hit by any government spending shocks.
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